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THE POSITION OF BELIEVERS AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS 
IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA 
By Zdenko Roter 
Zdenko Roter (Marxist) is the dean and professor of sociology at the School of 
Sociology, Political Science and Journalism at University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia. 
Dr. Roter was educated at University of Ljubljana and University of Sarajevo and 
wrote a number of books on church-state relations in Yugoslavia, sociologies of 
religion, and studies on public opinion in Slovenia. Previous articles of his appeared 
in OPREE, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (May 1 988). This paper was prepared for the Second 
International Conference on ways to promote the 1 9 8 1  U.N. Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief, "Building Understanding and Respect between People of Diverse Religions or 
Beliefs," Warsaw, Poland, May 1 4- 1 8 ,  1 989. 
There are two reasons why I am using the case of Yugosl�via in order to deal with the 
theme of believers as second-class citizens. The first one is simply that I am living and 
working as a scholar in that country. It is my ethical and scholarly responsibility not to 
restrict the results of my many years of scholarly investigation only within the borders of my 
country, regardless whether the results of that scientific investigation are "favorable" or 
"unfavorable" for my country. I consider sociology to be a critical social science, which must 
be emancipated from ideological and politocratic structures regardless of possible personal 
consequences. For that reason I do not accept the ideological classification into Marxist and 
bourgeois sociology, according to which the former ought to be an apologist for the socialist 
(Marxist) social system, because the latter, according to this classification, defends, by 
definition the capitalist system. 
The second reason is in my conviction that there are some key characteristics valid for 
all socialist countries. Concisely these characteristics could be expressed by the term "real 
socialism," which was accepted in Yugoslav sociology more or less as a key analytical concept 
for the entire social reality of these countries. The analysis of the social position of believers 
as second-class citizens in Yugoslavia could turn out to be instructive also for others and 
permits a certain generalization of the results of such an investigation. 
I 
For our analysis it is of crucial importance first to identify these key characteristics 
which are in the closest correspondence with the predominant doctrinal ideology, namely that 
it is possible to change the global system as a natural system by "revolutionary" means into 
a socialist society.1 Such changes are decided upon and implemented by the Communist 
Party, which alone knows the goals of social construction. 
The first characteristic is, accordingly, a one party system, which alone permits the 
efficacious realization of the elaborated social construction. A multi-party system in principle 
is not possible. The Communist Party becomes normatively assigned (by means of 
constitutional or other legal texts) as an avant garde social elite, which has the right to 
determine the direction of social development in all social spheres in accordance with the 
values and criteria of their own aims regardless of the will and attitude of the citizens. The 
radical conclusion is that political democracy, as an universal achievement of human 
civilization, is viewed as an anti-systemic structure. 
The second characteristic is reflected in a completely closed systemic social model. 
Effective directing of social development is possible only by denial of freedom of all 
individual behavior which does not coincide with the specified conception of the social 
project. In the contrary case, the permission of innovative attempts of individuals or social 
groups would permanently threaten the Party's social project and therefore their realization 
is thwarted or even completely prevented. Therefore civil and human rights in these 
countries are in principle unacceptable because they are against the system.2 
The third characteristic deals with the logic of the structure of the project and the model 
of leadership of social development. The model of leadership is strictly hierarchical. That 
means, firstly, that the general principles of the project without exception determine the 
positions and solutions on the lower levels. The individual and particular must function 
strictly as part of the general; that is axiomatic and without discussion. Out of it follows that 
centralization is the essential part of the social construct.3 All the initiatives, ideas, and 
general solutions always stem from the "center" and are transmitted by middle, lower, and 
lowest levels of hierarchic structures, namely, from top to bottom. Every other way, 
primarily from the bottom to the top, is regarded as explicitly anti-systemic and is therefore 
consistently repressed. 
1Every serious analysis of programmatic (constitutional and party) document in Eastern European 
countries quickly supports this hypothesis. See, for example, the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974. 
2 For numerous reasons socialist countries cannot publicly declare these views and therefore the 
constitutions of these countries (even the Stalinist Constitution of 1936) list and include all the 
essential components of the declarations and conv.entions on human rights. However, their practice 
is_impossible. Such inclusions of human and civil rights function exclusively to create the appearance 
of legitimation of political power. 
3 Although the organization of state power contains is a declaration o
'
f local self)governance, 
regional autonomy or similar, in reality they do not function, but serve to legitimate political power. 
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The fourth determinant relates to the character and meaning of the state and the 
government. The state, as a means by which the Communist Party uses for the realization 
of its p_roject, in principle cannot be the so called state of laws, in the classic meaning of that 
term. The socialist state is perceived as the "absolute" rule which is not bound by any norms 
of"Jaws which would precede public laws, e.g. natural human rights or private, special rights 
as the source of legal norms and human rights. The only original source of legal norms is 
public law. Practically this means that all social structures and activities are clearly legally 
regulated with the application of the principle that everything is forbidden unless explicitly 
allowed. That also means that there is a need for an enormous administrative apparatus not 
only for the carrying out of that which is legally stipulated, but also for the control and 
repression of everything that appears outside the legally regulated and not only for the 
repression of everything which is against the norms. The state takes on the function of 
defending the Party's project but not the function of defending civil and human rights. 
The fifth characteristic is that in these societies the natural activity of the market system 
is replaced by measures of the Communist Party and the state. That means the absolute 
predominance of the administrative regulation and activity even in the economy. Planned 
economy is the slogan of that model. According to the above mentioned principle, even the 
economy functions according to the hierarchical form of administration. An independent, 
autonomous economic enterprise is impossible in principle because it is an anti-systemic 
entity. Also impossible is private ownership, or so called pluralism in the form of ownership. 
Likewise impossible is the actual functioning of social ownership or self -management 
regardless of its basic socially progressive significance. Basically only state ownership with 
all its consequences is acceptable. This means that ownership is in the hands of political 
rulers. Since the administering of this state ownership cannot be done directly and absolutely, 
the political rulers (depending explicitly or implicitly from the conditions in different 
socialist countries) distribute ownership rights to individual producers and thereby create 
not only the appearance but also the real relationships characteristic for feudal forms of 
property ownership. Looking at it radically that means that ownership in these countries is 
privately owned by the state, but that all rights which are derived from it are in the hands 
of the political power-holders, who distribute these powers arbitrarily. And since the holder 
of the power is the Communist Party that means that the party controls absolutely all 
processes and channels of use of these distributed rights.4 At least for now one cannot deny 
4Because of that in my country of Yugoslavia it was not possible to accomplish the great 
projected economic and social reform which was launched in 1950 under the name self­
management. One should say, that this project, despite the failure of its implementation remains 
theoretically and humanistically very interesting and still opens the possibility of the realization of 
great human hopes of a socially just society. 
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that in various socialist socicics there are other characteristics or parallel sub-systems of 
private and cooperative ownersh ip, but only as minor phenomena. 
The sixth characteristic is the {im)possibility of articulating various individual and group 
interests or even showing initiative in all spheres of societal life, from culture to politics and 
economics. Such natural articulation is in principle anti-systemic at least in so far as the 
interests and initiatives collide with the vision and articulation of the projected development 
by the leading Communist political elite.5 Due to this it is impossible to have autonomous 
associations and organizations even in the economy, and even less in politics or elsewhere. 
Every form of associations of interests is prescribed "from above" or allowed only on the 
basis of prior permission of the hierarchically determined political (party) governing organ. 
Consequently self-management, in the sense of activity independent of the center of the 
system, is, as stated previously, not acceptable in principle for the said system. Since in all 
those countries (especially in Yugoslavia) there are forms of associating and acting which are 
called self -management, one should state that these are limited forms of self -management, 
forms which we might call para-self -management. They should not be underestimated but 
it is important to see their limits. These limits are determined by the normative system of 
government which in principle allow the center of political power to intervene arbitrarily and 
freely either into the functioning of individual politico-territorial units (republic, commune, 
county, autonomous region, or similar), individual economic enterprises, or normatively 
determined "self -managed" associations. More specifically: it is not only a case of para­
self -managing but of pseudo-self -managing. The form of arbitration from the center varies 
from country to country. In those cases where there is a full identity between the 
government and the party leadership the arbitrating of the party is exploitative. If there is 
a declared separation of the government and party organization, the party arbitration is 
implicit, but no less effective. Hence, all attempts by political-territorial units 
(communities) to function autonomously are regarded anti-systemic. A radical conflict­
situation therefore emerges especially in the case of republics and (formally) autonomous 
regions in which there is a close identity between the political and ethnic (national) 
community.6 
The seventh characteristic deals with the axiomatic claim that the project of the 
Communist Party is scientific with an a priori assertion that Marxism is a science. The result 
5 Here I need to call to attention the necessity of distinguishing between the Communist Party 
in its entirety and the leading political elite. Namely, due to the same systemic reasons even party 
members are denied every possibil ity of free initiative, which would collide with the project of the 
leadership. The notion of dissident is most closely related with this situation. 
6Current conflicts between nationalities and ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and 
Romania, and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia can be analyzed in this context. 
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is a slogan about scientific socialism, a scientific worldview (Weltanschauung), a scientific 
school, etc. The Communist Party is represented not merely as avant garde, a leading social 
subject, but also as the carrier, "owner" of an avant gardist scientific ideology, which 
provides, without exception, scientific solutions for all spheres of social life. The existence 
of other ideologies (and religions) may, at best, be tolerated. Competitive, alternative 
functioning of other ideologies is regarded as anti-systemic. Every form of competitiveness 
disturbs the system thus conceived. Therefore special defense mechanisms are created under 
the guidance of the political center. The final radical consequence of the defense mechanism 
is that it develops into a mechanism of repression (Party and state) whose goal is to destroy 
or at least marginalize the alternative ideologies. Historical evidence points to the conclusion 
that the final variant is when Marxism becomes an explicitly fundamentalist para-religion, 
which shows signs of aggression and destruction of other patterns of thought and behavior 
of people, both individuals and groups. 
Based on the above listed characteristics of real Socialist societies (formulated as ideal 
types in Weber's meaning of the term) we can determine the essential characteristics of the 
social position of (religious) believers within these societies. Not taking into account, for the 
time being, the rich and manifold historical and sociological evidence which testifies to the 
events in the field of religion of Eastern European socialist countries (including Yugoslavia), 
but paying attention exclusively to the character of these societies, we can list the some of 
the essential characteristics of this process. 
I. At best,  the system tolerates the existence of various religious groups, religious 
organizations and communities. For a variety of reasons the decision is not to prohibit 
completely their formal existence and activity (except in Albania). However, a whole series 
of legal mechanisms for the limitation of their activities with the goal of social 
marginalization of religious organizations was established. The ideologically primary concept 
of the freedom of religious activity actually limits that freedom to liturgical activity within 
church buildings. The single party system, which was established after the revolution, cannot 
accept any organization, especially political, which is not under its direct control or is 
explicitly permitted by it. Large churches especially (i.e. Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant) 
are not only institutions outside the system, but represent a great challenge to the system due 
to their very existence. Such churches are, namely, not some small, insignificant oases 
outside the system, but represent a significant and influential segment of society, which the 
system is unable to control directly and cannot exert an influence upon its internal structure, 
and even less so upon the church's teaching. For the system the Catholic Church is a special 
challenge due to worldwide (international) character with a hierarchical center outside the 
country, which they cannot influence. The existence of such large churches within socialist 
countries, according to the fundamentalist interpretation of Marxism, corresponds to an 
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unfinished revolution. Therefore there are numerous actions (reactions) of the system with 
the goal of carrying· out the revolution as originally conceived. Sociological and historical 
evidence about various persecutions and even massacres (pogroms) testifies about these 
attempts to finish the revolution. 
2. The avant garde political party, which insists on the absolute monopoly of social 
decision-making, starting with the assumption of power, and even more so later, needs the 
justificat ion of its own fa ilures. Therefore churches can serve as a welcome scapegoat who 
is blamed for failures in the "building of socialism." Failures might threaten the monopoly 
of the avant garde in the eyes of the population. Therefore the system. must construe a 
subject of responsibility outside itself. Such a function is taken over by "the class enemy." 
Although it is desirable that such an enemy, in principle, be basicly imaginary and 
undetermined (therefore slogans such as nationalism, technocracy, bureaucracy, liberalism, 
etatism, dogmatism, anarchism, anticommunism, antisocialism, contrarevolution--all 
functioning as the "class enemy") yet, in various phases of the so called struggle against the 
"class enemy" the. system ascribes responsibility for its own failures also to the churches. 
That leads to new repressions and new limitations for religious organizations and institutions. 
3. Slogans produced by the system, as well as ideological fantasies about the "danger of 
clericalism or cleronationalism." especially in the case of Yugoslavia, play a special role. 
Looking at it objectively, one detects the most sensitive spot of the system about the 
competit iveness in the political sphere of society. Simple monopoly does not only include the 
monopoly of a political ideology which creates and achieves things "from. top �o bottom," 
from the political center downward, but excludes generally every political initiative "from 
bottom up" and within the system, if this initiative is against the ruling political values and 
solutions. Even more so it excludes every political initiative of political subjects outside the 
system. Every political initiative, even in the form of moral attitudes expressed toward 
specific social and political events, which might come from religious groups or organizations, 
especially from churches, are · in principle anti-systemic. Therefore they are repressed. 
Exceptions are possible due to tactical political reasons only w�en religious groups or 
individuals give supportive statement about the existing political and social system. In its 
function of legitimizing the existing system such exceptions may even be accorded the status 
of the permitted.7 The charge of clericalism (or the abuse of belief and the church for 
political purposes) is applied to every instance of articulating a critical moral-political 
reflection upon social reality by the believers and especially by church leaders. J:he charge 
7Paradigmatic cases of this kind are the well known and by the system supported patriotic clergy 
associations in all socialist countries. 
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of cleronationalism as a stigma ·is applied in principle to every attempt of public 
pronouncement by the church about the relationship between religion and the nation. 
4. Citizens-believers, members of religious communities, may, according to the 
announcement of the system, if they have political aspirations, involve themselves only in 
existing socio-political organizations which have been recognized by the system. This is true 
both for organizations in the narrower sense of the word, as well as for other nonpolitical or 
prepolitical associations and societies. The network of socio-political organizations, 
associatipns and societies is prescribed from the center and allows no exceptions, 
spontaneities or initiatives from "bottom up." 
Even in this respect there are two limitations for citize
.
ns-believers. The first is in regard 
to the possible ways of their participation in political and social life. The system does not 
tolerate, much less permit, any explicit appeal to religious values for such participation. The 
believer can function only as an abstract citizen and must, in accord with the system's 
principle that belief is only a separate personal concern, leave her, or his religious convictions 
"at home." The second, even more essential limitation, has to do with the absolute party 
monopoly. Accordingly, the entire network of socio-political organizations, associations, and 
societies functions exclusively as a transmission mechanism of the Communist Party. The 
programs of these organizations sometimes even explicitly state that they are identical with 
the Party program. Since the Party program normally values religion negatively, aiming at 
its "dying out," believers find themselves in a situation of acting against their own 
convictions, aspirations, and interests. 
5. The status of believers as second-class citizens is the direct result of the avant garde 
societal role of the Communist Party. Explicitly or implicitly all Communist Parties of 
Eastern Europe accept the Bolshevik concept about religion as an obstacle for the full 
participation of believers in activities aiming at changing social relations. Therefore believers 
are not allowed to join the Communist Party, which is a privileged political institution. This 
is reflected not only in the fact that there are few believers who are party members, but also 
that, practically speaking, they are absent from the organs of government, centers and places 
where the greatest amount of political and social power is concentrated. The system gives 
preference in such roles and places to members of the Communist Party. Therefore, as a 
norm, believers are excluded from governing institutions. There is a negligible chance that 
they may succeed to be involved in leadership positions of any social sphere (from economic 
and political to cultural and educational). Some analysts even regard believers are third­
class citizens, because second-class citizenship is accorded to all nonmembers of the 
Communist Party, among whom are also nonbelievers. From the perspective of the system 
public expression of religious convictions are a sufficient reason for sharper attacks upon 
religious than irreligious non-Party members. Social, professional, and political promotion 
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of citizens-believers is therefore not only systematically made impossible or obstructed by 
the system but is declared as anti-systemic because it would cause problems with the political 
monopoly of Communist Party members. 
6. The ideological slogan of the scientific worldview, which seeks the systematic 
acceptance of this view, namely the homogenization of the worldview conception, specially 
harms the believers. The religious worldview is regarded by the system as a specially 
dangerous obstacle in the elimination of nonscientific worldviews. The concept of scientific 
worldview is claimed to be identical with Marxism, which in principle included atheism, 
formulated as militant atheism. The religious worldview is seen as being theistic, hence in 
complete contradiction with the Marxist. On that basis in all socialist countries, a more or 
less strictly institutionalized system reeducates citizens in the aim of homogenizing their 
world view. This was especially manifested in the school system either 1n the form of explicit 
or implicit obligatory study of so called scientific atheism. One must not underestimate the 
importance of the separate system of atheist propaganda from atheist museums and exhibits 
to publishing activities. All of that had many psychological effects upon the spiritual world 
of the believing population. They were constantly exposed to pressure, which caused mass 
traumatization of believers as they were convinced, with good reason, that even in 
contemporary socialism, and more so in the future, their convictions are undesirable. 
From all the above on the basis of the analysis of the system, we can conclude that the 
interpretative hypothesis of the second-class position of believers under conditions of real 
socialist societies is warranted. Second-class citizenship is a sociological metaphor for the 
social position of all those citizens, individuals and groups, whose models of thought and 
behavior do not fit into the system of prescribed and by the political and ideological 
monolith desired forms of thinking and behaving. Conflict between required behavior and 
the natural behavior of citizens as human beings as a rule ends with negative consequences 
for the social position of all who are "disobediept" and "insubordinate". Historical and 
sociological evidence testifies about various forms of such consequences in those countries 
ranging from the complete marginalization in society to the revocation of citizenship and 
exile. Believers experience this in a special manner also, because, as a rule, when compared 
with others, they are also members of religious organizations and churches. Second-class 
citizenship does not manifest itself merely in the form of personal experience, repression, 
and unpleasantries, but also in collection problems and the factual exclusion from the system. 
The forms of repression and exclusion from the system differ from country to country. 
Each one them, from the U.S.S.R. to Yugoslavia, have their peculiarities. But none of the 
specificities of Eastern European countries leads to the loss of the common characteristics 
which we described. 
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Already at this point in our analysis we must assert that the model of real socialism never 
functioned perfectly nor optimally in any of these countries in the course of various time 
periods. What is obvious is that in this moment the social reality of real socialist countries 
is experiencing a serious, all-encompassing structural and comprehensive social crisis of the 
"second wave." Out of that crisis came many initiatives of new (and old) political elites in 
order to reform the system. Glasnost, perestroika, "new thinking," rights of people, new 
socialism, socialism with a human face are only some of the slogans which connote change, 
new possibilities, and even new horizons not only for socialist countries but for all of 
humanity. It is clear that the single party system of rule is not an exemplary form of 
governing highly developed societies. The single party system, as we already noticed, 
presupposes undeveloped human structures, hierarchical and bureaucratic rule and thereby 
establishes only a single center of organization which has all the "truth." Feedback of 
information, which is needed by every system, has the sole function in real socialism to exert 
control about how exactly and faithfully lower levels execute directives and decrees sent 
from above. Looking at this system sociologically this model contains the largest number 
of instances of the enlightenment absolutist state with pronounced feudal components. The 
crisis had to take place also because the system is totally unable to adapt itself and respond 
to the demands of the contemporary age which were raised by the structures of the post­
industrial information society. All socialist societies are latently or even manifestly facing a 
crystal clear . alternative: remain within the framework of the prevalent real socialist 
conception or look for solutions, reforms, and corrections within the system or even reject 
that concept and construct a model of a natural system, which would in essence mean to 
construct a social-democratic model, as it functions in some European countries. According 
to the first alternative the reforms would in the final instance mean still greater 
centralization, administrative arbitrariness in all social relations, an even greater degree of 
economic, political, cultural, and spiritual homogenization and more efficient control from 
top to bottom. In the latter case a social-democratization of the entire system would occur 
with positive consequences in economics, politics, and culture as well as in the field of 
human rights. The fate of the so called religious question depends on whether the first or 
the second option will be implemented. At the present there are still open possibilities for 
the implementation of either option. Therefore it is still useful to reflect about the second­
class status of religious believers as citizens in these countries. 
II 
At the time of this writing [April 1 989] Yugoslavia is facing a deep, all-encompassing 
social crisis, the likes of which was not seen since 1945. Today it is clear, that despite 
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attempts in the past to distance the country from the model of real socialism, this has not 
occurred. Several very opportune occasions to achieve this goal were missed. 
The first opportunity was immediately in 1945, after the War and after the completely 
autochthonous movement for national liberation, which already during World War II came 
into conflict with Stalinist Bolshevism. Despite efforts for other alternatives, the victorious 
Communist elite accepted the Stalinist Bolshevik model of social organization in its entirety. 
The second opportunity came in 1 948 after the brutal conflict betweenStalin and Tito, 
when society had to find a new identity in order to be d�stinguishable from the Stalinist 
model. The massive support which the population gave to Tito opened incredible 
opportunities for a change. However, the case of Milovan Djilas in 1953 testifies that the 
political elite did not wish to abandon the concept of political, cultural, and economic 
monoli thism. Renewed serious attempts were related to the program of economic and social 
reform in 1956 which did not succeed for the same reasons and terminated in the "icy" 1970s 
(as sociologists called it) which led to the new homogenization of all social sectors supported 
by significant repressions. The second half of 1980s (after Tito's death in 1980) show signs 
of even deeper social crises which may resolve themselves in either of the two directions 
described earlier. 
The first real efforts to transcend the real socialist model in Yugoslavia can be 
undoubtedly identified in the second half of the I 960s in the form of the fairly important 
movement toward dialogue between Marxists and Christians. The significance of that 
movement, whose protagonists are intellectuals from both sides, especially in parts of 
Yugoslavia in which the Catholic Church is predominant (Slovenia and Croatia), is .that the 
concept .in itself presupposes equality of all who participate in the dialogue, including the 
equal ity of Christians. The public manifestations of this movement brought a lot of fresh 
ideas in the cultural and spiritual sphere although politicians were at best tolerant but 
simultaneously kept "closing" the intellectual space. However, one should not underestimate 
the impact of this movement for the softening of political attitudes toward religious 
organizations and a certain liberalization in regard to the exercise of all human rights by 
believers. "The ice years" essentially suspended the dialogue or at least completely 
marginalized it. The political center was skillfully able to manipulate the religious pluralism 
of Yugoslavia with which there are permanently connected latent or manifest tensions and 
oppos i t ion between the three great religions of Yugoslavia, namely Catholicism, Orthodoxy, 
and Islam. 
The second, more serious attempt of public reflection of religious freedoms and related 
social position of believers was the publication of the results of empirical research of 
sociologists of religion about religious phenomena in various parts of the country, and 
especially in Slovenia, Croatia (Zagreb, Split) and Serbia (Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad). The 
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empirically oriented sociology of religion definitely destroyed the monopoly of ideology and 
politics in this field. By means of its activity it "legalized" religious views, convictions, and 
practice. The publication of the results of the empirical research greatly demystified 
ideological positions about the marginalization of religious convictions and the influence of 
religious communities. Though it may sound anachronistic, by means of this research 
religious phenomena received the dignity of an object of scientific research and lost to a 
large degree the status of an object of obligatory ideological manipulation. 
Nevertheless the publishing of the results of empirical research, which deal directly with 
the question of the political and social equality of believers as citizens, during their 
publication in 1 986 encountered a severe political and ideological reaction even in Slovenia, 
the westernmost part of the country which has the reputation of having a liberal political 
elite. This was less in regard to the reliability of the data (numbers) but more in regard to 
our efforts to interpret the empirical data, although the interpretation was in the form of 
interpretative hypotheses in so far as we attempted to relate the existing situation to the 
system, either by defining the system's defects or by pointing to the logic of the system's 
production. 
During the annual polling of public opinion in the republic of Slovenia--an independent 
federal unit of Yugoslavia--in the 1 980s we have already thrice polled a representative 
sample of the population and among the others also asked the following question:8 
Do you think that the believing (religious) citizens. are · in any manner neglected 
(abused), are in an unequal position or not? 
In the annual poll we received the following distribution: of replies to this question: 
-no,they are not being neglected 
in any respect 
-in principle and by the 
constitution they are not, but 
in practice it does occur 
1 983 1 984 1 986 
65.7% 6 1 .6% 6 1 .7% 
20.3% 25.4% 22.9% 
8Slovenia is one of the six republics and two autonomous regions which make up Yugoslavia. 
It is Yugoslavia's western-most part bordering Italy. Austria, and Hungary. Nationally it is 
homogeneous, because the Slovene people represent nearly 1 00% of the population of the republic. 
The Catholic religion is absolutely predominant. According to research in 1 988 58% of the population 
(over 1 8  years old) declared itself religious. The research of public opinion is being carried out by 
the scientific institute of he School of Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism of the University 
in Ljubljana. The sample is representative (21 00 questioned). The population is about 2 million, 
which represents 8% of Yugoslavia's population. 
1 1  
-Y§, in principle they are being 
neglected 
-I do not know, undecided 
3 .0% 2.7% 
1 1 .0% 1 0.3% 
4. 1 %  
1 1 .3% 
Parallel with these data we had the use of research data regarding views and values of 
high school youth in Slovenia ( I  980, 1 98 1 ,  and 1 986) in which the diversity of positions was 
even more accentuated. As much as 45% ( 1980), 44% ( 1 9 8 1 )  and 48.8% (1986) opined that 
in practice believers are being neglected.9 
The interpretation of the cited empirical data started with the presupposition that the 
declared statements about human and citizens liberties in the Constitution of Yugoslavia are 
not problematic, because these definitions were taken over from the generally accepted 
international conventions and declarations. Further they started with the presupposition that 
perceptions of the restrictions of these liberties (in our case the political and other freedoms 
of believing citizens) depend upon many socio-demographic, statutory, and other factors. 
Also taken into account was that less than the entire population is religious. Namely the 
sociological evidence in these years when research was done, was that 50-53% of the entire 
' ' 
grownup (over 1 8  years of age) population is religious. That means that we had to take into 
consideration that the sensibility of believers in that respect is probably different from the 
sensibility of nonbelievers. Additional material for our interpretation was also the written 
replies of the high school students ( 1 980, 1 98 1 )  who could (and mostly did) document their 
answers with examples from life, which led to the conclusion that citizens who are believers 
are in practice neglected. That led us to look for an answer why the high school students 
( 14- 1 8  years old) perceived a greater neglect of believers than did adults. From the above 
as well as the broader referential framework resulting from the real socialist reality, we 
believe that the fact that every fourth respondent points to the violation of civil rights of 
bel ievers cannot be interpreted as accidental or as a ;'natural phenomenon" which appears 
only in the model but not in real life� The density of "cases" is so great that at least it points 
to defects in the system. This system includes social, legal, or psychological mechanisms 
9Research of the views of high school students in 1 986 in Slovenia (representative sample) was 
carried out by the scientific institute of the School of Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism 
of the University of Ljubljana within an international project of European youth and peace, which 
was launched by the School of Pedagogical Sciences (UPS) in Rome, Italy .. Research in 1 980 and 
1 98 1  was also carried out by the Ljubljana institute. The question about the equality of believers 
was formulated identically. 
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which block or at least limit the opportunities for believers in their attempts to exercise the 
declared human and civil rights. 
A paradigmatic example of these mechanisms is the operation of so called moral-political 
fitness. Until recently all public job opening announcements, especially for leadership 
positions, included also the request that the candidate demonstrate moral and political fitness 
for the job. In practice it is clear that this always indicates the selection of a member of the 
Communist Party. Factually believers were obstructed in their "regular" professional 
promotion. This was even more accentuated in political promotion. How else to explain the 
fact that there are no believers in the highest levels of federal , republican, and even local 
governments? While in the lowest institutions of self-management (local communities) one 
can still find here and there a believer as a president or secretary, this does not happen at the 
level of the county, region , republic, or federation. 
The system of real socialism produces suspicion of nonparty members, especially 
believers. The system of so called "cadre coordination" (formally within the framework of 
the Socialist A lliance of the Working People) places control mechanisms at all levels of the 
system, which, without exception, gives preference in political elections to members of the 
Communist Party and others who are "morally and politically fit." A special system of 
selecting "cadres" function also for professional service in the army and police. Empirical 
investigations of (non)religiosity in the republic of Croatia, for instance, show that people 
in those services are mostly members of the Communist Party. A similar system of selection, 
though not so rigid and explicit can be found in the field of education, especially in middle 
and higher schools and in the state administration of the republican or federal levels. 
Moral-political fitness was practically until yesterday the criterium for selecting and 
retaining university professors. A special impact in that respect was the decree in the statute 
and program of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia that nonreligiosity is a condition of 
membership. This is then connected to the constitutional provision about the leading role of 
the Communist Party in society. This means that the party is legally privileged and so are 
its members when compared to other citizens and especially believers. 
Church hierarchies of both the Catholic and the Orthodox churches frequently pointed 
out these facts both as the base and the cause of the second-class citizenship of believers. 
The importance of these empirical data consists also in pointing out that the perception of 
the "inequality of believers in practice" is present not only among believers but also among 
nonbelievers or undecided. The distribution of this perception among believers is above the 
Slovene average ( 1 983: 26. 7%, 1 984: 33.2%, 1 986: 33.9%). That is understandable on account 
of their greater sensibilities. The distribution of this perception among nonbelievers, as one 
may expect, is under the Slovene average ( 1 983: 1 7.8%, 1 984: 20.3%, 1 986: 1 7.8%). However, 
nearly every fifth citizen nonbeliever confirms the discrimination of believers. The same 
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trend one can see in the distribution among (non)religious high school students in Slovenia. 
Among high school students who attend catechism classes (research of 1 986) the view that 
believers are discriminated against is as high as 7 1 %. 
How to interpret the greater degree of criticism among the youth? Why is the sensibility 
of h igh school believers greater than among adult believers? The social structure of adult 
bel ievers certainly affects the distribution of their views. In 1 986 the believing population 
was made of 7 1 .8% of qualified laborers, farmers, retirees, and homemakers, 1 9.8% were 
white collar workers, and the rest made up 8 .3%. This social composition of believers 
determines the lower level of perception about their social position as citizens-believers as 
does the larger distance between them and those social segments which due to discrimination 
on account of relig ious conviction they are practically absent (politics, eduction, army, 
police, publ ic admin istrat ion, and organs of government). High school students, on the other 
hand, experience discrimination more directly on account of their experience of the 
promotion of the scientific (Marxist) worldview. The young are less conformists by 
I 
definit ion and their experience tends to be more emotional than that of adults. 
These hypotheses are supported by the documentation of the statements by the youth as 
to where and how discrimination against believers is taking place, which they made during 
the poll ing. The majority of statements point to discrimination in: 
schools (singling out believers, discrimination against teachers who are believers, 
preferential treatment of atheism), 
profess ional promotion (preferential treatment of Communists in job applications when 
compared to believers, stipends and financial assistance for education, discrimination against 
believers for the teaching positions), 
poli tical advancement (there are no believers in any significant political institutions, the 
exclus ion of believers from pol it ics due to moral-poli tical fitness criteria), 
suspicion by the general public toward religion and believers (here they mention critical 
and derisive articles about religion in the press, ridicule by political leaders, identification 
of religion with superstition, trickery, and fallacy, and the general negative atmosphere in 
regard to religion in all  of society), 
privi leged social position of Communists (Communists have a priori greater rights in their 
jobs, politics and elsewhere; in all leading positions one finds only Communists), 
bel ievers cannot be members of the Communist Party (that means they cannot be in 
certain professions such as police, customs, army, and this also means the prohibition for 
Communists to belong to the church which directly intervenes into human and familial 
relations), 
1 4  
the abuse of clergy (the position of clergy is discriminated against, the press and other 
media attack clergy, students of theology are not treated equally with other students by 
government organs), 
radio and television (inability of clergy to appear on their programs, religious events are 
not considered newsworthy, no worship services are broadcast), 
army (religion and believers are treated differently, i.e. negatively in the spirit of 
scientific and militant atheism). 
These are the main social sectors and manners which high school students identify as 
areas in which there is abuse of religion and believers. They form the basis of the perception 
of the inequality of believers. 
The ideological and political reaction was sharp and negative in respect to our 
interpretation that all empirical evidence points to the conclusion that a large number of 
believers as well as other citizens experience the socialist system as discriminatory 
mechanisms against believers and who experience their social position as being second-class 
citizens. Using the old neo-stalinist approach they stressed that this was a misuse of 
scholarly and professional research for "antagonistic purposes," which supposedly happens 
whenever the socialist system is in difficulty and crisis. The Constitutional provisions about 
the equality all citizens before the law regardless of worldview and religion are supposedly 
the best proof about the untruthfulness and unacceptability of the thesis of second-class 
citizenship of believers. Since the authors of these ideological and political writings were 
unable to completely negate some of the well-known negative instances, they explained the 
abuse of believers with the well-known Bolshevik slogan about "sectarianism." Some 
Communists, supposedly, do not understand correctly the social approach to believers and 
make mistakes in their actions. They are usually provoked by clerical activities, especially by 
clergy, who tend to abuse belief and church for political purposes. Any other interpretation, 
therefore, means a reactionary, even contra-revolutionary attack upon all the foundations of 
the socialist system. And so forth. 
Despite all of this sociological science, based on empirical data and analysis of the whole 
system remains firm in its interpretational hypothesis about the second-class citizenship of 
believers. We were also convinced by data obtained from the research of public opinion in 
Slovenia in 1 987, when we tested again the question of the social inequality of believers. The 
percentage of those who believe that there is no inequality in the constitution and the laws 
but that in practice there is such inequality increased from 22.9% in 1 986 to 33.00% with an 
additional 3.8% who believe there is general inequality. The percentage of those who state 
that there is no inequality in theory or practice fell from 6 1 .7% in 1 986 to 52.9%. Knowing 
the situation in our country we cannot interpret this as meaning there is an increase of 
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believers. More plausible is the interpretative hypothesis that especially since 1 986 there is 
increased awareness by citizens, including believers, about their human and civil rights. 
In the recent years (especially since 1 987) there came a change in Yugoslavia, along with 
the escalation of the social crisis. These changes are symbolized by three slogans by which 
the political elite announces its willingness to change: economic reform, the reform of the 
political system, and the reform of the Communist Party. In the field of politics a 
reaffirmation of political pluralism occurred. In regard to the reform of the Communist 
Party there is not only a greater demand of separating the Communist Party from the 
government but also for the elimination of the constitutional provision of its privileged and 
leading role. The essential qualitative novelty is that there is also a strongly articulated 
pressure for change from the bottom, and at least in certain parts of the country (this is 
especially true for Slovenia) there are also at the top political elites which are very liberally 
oriented and to whom change does not mean only a political tactic out of necessity but also 
a new political strategy under the slogan "new socialism." Ih th�t context there emerged a 
more relaxed climate also in regard to the religious question; 
The social and political scene is still completely open; a,ll options and attempts to deal 
with the crisis are possible. The fate of the question of the second-class citizenship of 
believers will depend upon the option taken. 
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